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Over the last decades, Private Equity (PE) has played an important role in Corporate Finance. 
According to ABVCAP (Associação Brasileira de Private Equity & Venture Capital), the 
Brazilian PE industry has grown substantially in the last years in terms of deals and volume 
(56,77% between 2011 and 2015) and has contributed to a considerable number of Initial Public 
Offerings (IPO) in the B3 - Brazil, Stock Exchange and Over-the-Counter Market (former 
BM&FBOVESPA – São Paulo’s stock exchange). 
I decided to do a research on this topic as the Brazilian Private Equity industry is still recent 
and so are IPOs in this country. Moreover, I chose this specific geography because I lived in 
Brazil and wanted to expand my knowledge regarding the emerging markets’ reality. Finally, I 
chose an area that could combine a theoretical knowledge with a more practical one – namely 
with the kind of job that I would like to have in the future. Therefore, I wanted to write 
something that would be Private Equity related. Thus, the hypothesis tested in this dissertation 
is: Private Equity positively affects post-IPO performance, with evidence from the Brazilian 
market. 
When studying the relationship between Private Equity investment and post-IPO performance, 
Cao and Lerner (2009) found that that PE-backed IPOs outperformed the non-PE-backed IPOs 
and the market as a whole. Moreover, Brav and Gompers (1997), concluded that in the five-
year time span following the Initial Public Offering, venture-backed IPOs outperformed non-
venture-backed IPOs when using equal weighted returns, between 1972-1992.  
In this dissertation, however, I could not reach the same conclusions for IPOs that occurred in 
Brazil between 2005 and 2014. 
This thesis is divided in 5 chapters that provide both a qualitative and quantitative analysis that 
attempt to answer the research question. In chapter 1, one finds the literature review which 
forms the qualitative part of this study and describes the Private Equity industry, displays some 
Private Equity investment and the Post-IPO performance Afonso Sacavém Potes (32294) 
5 
 
explanations regarding Initial Public Offerings and presents conclusions regarding the 
relationship between Private Equity investment and the post-IPO performance. Chapter 2 
describes the research question and the hypothesis tested and chapter 3 contains both the data 
description and the methodology used to perform the empirical study. In chapter 4, an analysis 
of the empirics as well as a discussion of the results is displayed and in chapter 5 the main 
conclusions are exhibited and some suggestions for future research are provided. 
1. Literature Review 
The relationship between Private Equity and long-run performance has been studied by 
numerous investigators and some conclusions have been drawn, which will be summarized in 
this section.  
1.1 Private Equity 
1.1.1 Introduction to PE 
Private Equity is a medium to long-term financial investment provided in return for equity in a 
company which capital is not listed on a public exchange.  
PE firms, also known as General Partners (GP), raise capital through PE funds using large 
amounts of debt (up to 80%) (Kaplan and Per Strömberg, 2008). These funds are limited 
partnerships in which the GP manages and the Limited Partners (LP) provide the capital that 
may be used to fund start-ups (venture capital), make acquisitions (growth equity or buyouts) 
or to strengthen balance sheets. The LPs can be both institutional investors - pension funds and 
insurance companies – or private investors such as foundations or wealthy individuals.  
Usually, funds are “close-ended” and typically have a 10-year life but, if extended, can reach 
13 years. In addition, the PE firms invest in the first five years and in the following five to eight 
years, return capital to the investors – period known as the “holding period”.  
Moreover, PE firms have return through three distinct forms: (1) management fees - usually, as 
a rule of thumb, are 1.5% to 2% of the capital committed (Barwon Investment Partners, Listed 
Private Equity investment and the Post-IPO performance Afonso Sacavém Potes (32294) 
6 
 
PE vs Unlisted PE fees, 2014), (2) carried interests - 20% performance fees on committed 
capital and profit (Metrick and Yasuda, 2010) – and (3) deal and monitoring fees paid by the 
portfolio companies (see Figure 1. in the “Attachments” section). 
In addition, the PE investment cycle comprises four stages. (1) It starts with screening 
investment opportunities. (2) Then, when the right ones are found, the GP must invest the 
capital provided by the LP on those. (3) Afterwards, the GP needs to manage the portfolio’s 
assets well enough to create value. (4) That creation of value will be reflected in the exit process, 
where the PE stake is sold to other investors.  
1.1.2 Main value drivers 
Private Equity firms combine both financial and governance engineering and make some 
operational improvements to profit from the purchased companies (Gompers, Kaplan and 
Mukharlyamov, 2015).  
Financial engineering consists on optimizing the portfolio companies’ capital structure through 
the reduction of marginal agency costs and minimizing its after-tax cost of capital – tax shield 
effect (Berg & Gottschalg, 2005) while governance engineering is the way that PE investors 
control the boards of their portfolio companies. PE investors are more actively involved in 
governance than public company boards (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2008). Regarding these two 
types of engineering, Kaplan (2009) concluded that both continue to be important, but not as 
differentiating as before. Hence, the best buyout firms have developed their operational 
engineering, which is defined as the industry and operating’s expertise that PE firms apply to 
identify attractive investments, develop value creation plans for those investments, and to 
implement the value creation plans (Kaplan and Stromberg, 2008). 
1.1.3 PE Exits 
Oppositely to a strategic buyer, PE firms look forward to exiting their investments, on average, 
in a 10 year-time (Kerester and Kim, 2017). PE investors exit their investments in five ways: 
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(1) initial public offerings, (2) trade sales (or acquisitions), (3) secondary sales (or refinancing), 
(4) management buy-outs and (5) write-offs (Cumming and Johan, 2013). 
The last two methods of exits are considered to be the least successful ones as they do not result 
in any significant capital into the firm. On the other hand, IPOs are considered to be the most 
successful method of exit for all parties due to the potential capital inflow into the firm and the 
potential profit to PE investors (Black and Gilson, 1998). 
It is relevant to mention that the IPO stage is not the exit per se but only a pre-stage since the 
PE firm is frequently required to hold the shares after the IPO for a pre-determined lock-up 
period – contractual restriction that prevents insiders such as founders, owners or employees to 
sell the company’s stock in the first 90 to 180 days after going public. When those shares are 
definitely sold on the stock market, then the exit takes place (Schwienbacher, 2009).  
1.1.4 PE industry in Brazil 
Globally, Private Equity deals boosted in the “eighties”, mainly through Leverage Buyouts 
since leveraging was cheap and the economic environment was favourable. However, in the 
following decade, the PE activity dropped firmly, until the 2000’s when it rose again with the 
appearance of the secondary leverage buyouts (Guo et al., 2011). 
In Brazil, the PE industry has accumulated more than three decades of experience, making it 
possible to examine the industry at the end of a complete PE investment and exit cycle (Ribeiro 
and Carvalho, 2008). When comparing the Brazilian PE industry to the European and the North 
American ones, the main differences besides the size are that in Brazil there is a tendency to 
invest in more advanced stages of corporate development, there is an avoidance of leveraged 
transactions since leveraging is expensive, there is lack of sector specialization and firms are 
concentrated in the country’s financial districts (Ribeiro and Carvalho, 2008). 
Regarding the PE exits in Brazil, until 2004 were mostly through trade sales and buybacks and 
2000 and 2001 were intense in write-offs, most likely due to the investment cycle of the dot.com 
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bubble (Ribeiro and Carvalho, 2008). However, the number of IPOs increased after 2004 and 
it is expected that they will continue to be a major exit mechanism in the following years.  
Finally, it is expected that in the near future, the industry continues to grow since there is a 
potential long-term GDP growth rate and conservative monetary policies, allowing Brazilian 
PE firms to consolidate industries, effecting operational improvements and explore different 
markets. 
1.2 Initial Public Offerings  
1.2.1 Introduction to the Initial Public Offerings 
An IPO can be defined as the sale of a firm’s securities in the form of shares for the first time 
and are an important source of financing for privately held companies through the access of 
public markets. As such, there are several reasons for a company to go public.  
The first reason is access to new funds, allowing them to access the public equity markets for 
additional capital necessary to fund future growth, while simultaneously providing a venue for 
the initial shareholders to sell their ownership stake (Kim and Weisbach, 2005).  
The second one is that firms may benefit from a change in leverage after the IPO, since the new 
equity capital raised might be used to reduce leverage and not to finance more investment and 
growth (Pagano, Panetta, & Zingales, 1998). Moreover, the enhancement on the companies’ 
image and publicity that an IPO offers may work as a certification by the financial market 
professionals and can be used as a marketing tool (Roells, 1996). 
Finally, factors such as motivating management teams and employees, as well as cashing in, 
are also good reasons to go public (Roells, 1996). 
Nevertheless, there are also disadvantages such as: direct costs, underpricing, costs of 
information disclosure, constraints on the freedom of action in making business decisions and 
the danger of loss of control, namely by a hostile takeover from another company (Roells,1996). 
However, the last one is unlikely to happen since controlling parties retain, on average, a 
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comfortable majority of voting rights several years after an IPO (Pagano et al., 1995). 
Regarding performance, Ritter (1991) found that during 1975-84, companies that went public 
have significantly underperformed comparable firms in similar industries from the closing price 
on the first day of public trading to their three-year anniversaries, leading to the conclusion that 
in the long-run, IPO investments tend to do worse than the market.  
1.2.2 Initial Public Offerings in Brazil 
Ritter and Welch (2002) concluded that “market conditions are the most important factor in the 
decision to go public” and that when market conditions get worse, stock prices drop and IPO 
volume declines since private firms prefer to wait for more favourable market conditions before 
going public. This may be the reason why there was a lack of IPOs in Brazil until 2004, which 
was not specific to the Private Equity industry. Nevertheless, in the last years, there are have 
been many Private Equity backed companies going through an IPO which is an important signal 
that the Brazilian PE industry has the capacity to perform the whole investment cycle, by exiting 
through an IPO. 
Moreover, the number of IPOs has risen from 2004 to 2007, but with the 2008 financial crisis, 
it slowed down again, as one will see in the data section of this study and in Graph 1 (in the 
“Attachments” section). 
Finally, factors such as the GDP growth, low interest rates, low inflation and the raise of credit 
conceded by the financial institutions (oppositely to the European and North American markets) 
may suggest that in the near future there will be room for more IPOs in Brazil. 
1.3 Private Equity post-IPO returns  
Regarding the influence of Private Equity investment and post-IPO returns, Brav and Gompers 
(1997) found that when returns are equally weighted, firms backed by venture capital 
outperform firms that are not PE-backed, over a period of five years after the IPO. Moreover, 
Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh (2011) found that the relationship between long-run 
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performance and IPOs backed by venture capital is positive and significant, since “more 
reputable VCs initially select better-quality firms, continuing to be associated with superior 
long-run performance”.  
In addition, Cao and Lerner (2009) found that in the three and five years after the IPO, not only 
PE-backed IPOs outperformed non-PE-backed IPOs but also the market as a whole.  
Finally, it was found that if a company goes under restructure during the period when it is 
owned by a PE firm, it is very likely that its performance will be great since Private Equities 
may use management strategies to increase sales growth, thus leading to better stock returns 
(Gluskin and Iskandar-Datta, 2015).  
Hence, the general findings of the existing literature show that PE-Backed IPOs outperform the 
non-PE-Backed ones in the long-run. 
2. Research Question and Hypothesis 
This dissertation follows a deductive approach, since it starts with an existing framework of 
previous findings and theories, from which I will formulate my own hypothesis.  
On the one hand, PE-backed firms are, on average, better than non-PE-backed firms due to the 
strategies used on the three forms of engineering, such as: (1) adding specific industry 
knowledge, (2) providing equity incentives to management teams and (3) maintaining a smaller 
board or cut company costs (Gompers, Kaplan and Mukharlyamov, 2015). Megginson and 
Weiss (1991) found that “at the time of the IPO, markets react positively to the presence of PE 
investment”. Thus, when PE backed firms go public, the price of the offerings reflect the 
market’s expectations and so does the long-run stock’s performance.   
On the other hand, PE firms are usually criticized for its focus on short-term value creation and 
strong attention to their own profit generation by sacrificing long-run value creation, which 
opens the possibility that PE firms may not have a better long-run performance than non-PE-
backed companies.  
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Since there are two possibilities, it is interesting to understand if after going public, PE-backed 
companies actually perform better than the non-PE-backed firms in Brazil. In case they do, it 
is important to understand what drives this overperformance. 
Therefore, the hypothesis that I intend to test is: Private Equity investment positively affects 
the post-IPO performance, which will then be rejected or not rejected. 
3. Data and Methodology 
In this chapter, I present the data and methodology used to develop the empirical study of this 
dissertation, describing the sample in both a quantitative and qualitative way as well as its 
collection process. In addition, in the methodology section, I explain my approach to the 
empirical results. Lastly, I present the regression model used and the independent variables 
chosen to run it. 
3.1 Data 
The initial set of IPOs was collected from Bloomberg’s database – which covers daily market 
transactions and stores financial and corporate governance data – and comprises 108 Initial 
Public Offerings between 2005 and 2014 meeting the following criteria: (1) the offer stage is 
currently “Trading”, (2) the offering only involved common stock, (3) the offer size (shares) 
was greater than 1 million and (4) all the information was disclosed for the three years after its 
IPO. 
To collect the daily close prices of each security I have used Thomson Reuter’s database.  
In this sample, almost 75% of the companies had an offer size between €100M and €500M and 
7% of them had an offer size between €1B and €10B. In addition, the sample is diversified in 
terms of industry sectors, such as: (1) Agriculture; (2) Business Support Services; (3) 
Construction; (4) Consumer Goods; (5) Energy; (6) Financial; (7) Healthcare; (8) Logistics and 
Transportations; (9) Real Estate; (10) Retail and (11) Technology, which can be seen in the 
table below. 




From the table above, it is possible to verify that the sectors where more companies went public 
were “Real Estate”, “Consumer Goods”, “Energy” and “Financial”. Moreover, the sectors that 
had more non-PE-Backed companies than PE-Backed companies going public were “Energy” 
and “Real Estate”. 
In addition, I have distributed the sample by year of occurrence of the IPO, as shown below. 
 
One can verify that the distribution of IPOs is not evenly distributed over the 2005-2014 period. 
An interesting point is that 65,74% of the IPOs occurred until 2008 (beginning of the financial 
crisis), mostly due to the large number of IPOs in 2007 which accounted for more than 40% of 
the total. In addition, after the financial crisis, the number of initial public offerings dropped 
considerably with only 1 IPO in 2014 – the lowest number of occurrences per year.  
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Moreover, 67 IPOs from this sample were PE-backed (62,04%). However, only 17,59% of 
those have occurred after 2007, which reflects the declining trend after the financial crisis. In 
addition, it is interesting to verify that there were no PE-backed IPOs in the last year of the 
sample. On the other hand, there were 41 non-PE-backed IPOs (which accounted for 37,96% 
of the sample) and these have been occurring in every year, despite the low occurrences after 
2012. 
3.2 Methodology 
To empirically study the post-IPO performance and compare the results between PE-backed 
and non-PE-backed IPOs, I have followed the approach proposed by Ritter (1991) in his paper 
“The long-run performance of Initial Public Offerings”, which is detailed below. 
3.2.1 Measures of long-run performance, statistical tests and regression models 
Regarding the post-IPO performance, returns were calculated, statistical tests were performed 
and regressions were run, to ensure that the results were robust, thus giving statistical 
significance to the changes in the variables between years.  
Since the goal is to understand if there is any particular event that affects the post-IPO 
performance, which in this study is the influence of Private Equity on companies before going 
public, two measures were used to evaluate the long-run performance: (1) a Buy and Hold 
strategy, in which two portfolios – one for PE-backed companies and another one for non-PE-
backed companies –  are created as the IPOs occur and the shares are not sold, while the total 
return is paid up at the end of the period studied and (2) calculate the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns for the two portfolios for three years (36 months) after the IPO.  
The main difference between the two methods is that the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
accounts for market effects and the Buy and Hold strategy with Cumulative Returns, does not. 
Finally, I performed a regression for each year after the IPO to understand if the Cumulative 
Abnormal Returns can be explained by any of the explicative variables. 
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3.2.1.1 Buy and Hold strategy  
The Buy and Hold strategy is a passive investment strategy where investors buy securities and 
hold them for an extended period of time, regardless of the market’s fluctuation. Ritter (1991) 
used it to measure the return of stocks that were bought on the first day after the IPO and kept 
in the portfolio for 3 years, using as benchmark a portfolio of similar companies, in order to 
compare his results. As such, the first step was to build the two portfolios. 
The returns used to measure the performance of the portfolios were calculated for four distinct 
intervals of time. The first one was the initial return period, also known as the first closing price, 
and the other three periods were the first, second and third years after the IPOs which is also 
known as the “after-market” period. 
Hence, to calculate the daily returns, I applied the following equation: 
                                                             Ri,T = 𝑙𝑛 (
Pi,T
Pi,T-1
)                                               Equation 1 
Where: 
Ri,T: Stock i return at time T  
Pi,T: Stock i closing price at time T  
Pi,T-1: Stock i closing price at time T-1 
Since one wants to know the difference between the portfolios’ returns, it is important to 
calculate the daily returns of the portfolios. Thus, I considered both portfolios to be equally 
weighted and applied equation 2.  
                                                         Rp,T = ∑ wi  Ri,T𝑁𝑖=1                                                  Equation 2 
Where: 
Rp,T: Return of the portfoliop at time T  
Wi: weight of the stocki in the portfolio 
N: Number of stocks in the portfolio 
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Finally, to compute the Cumulative Returns of the two portfolios for different periods, I used 
the following equation:  
                                                   CRp = [ ∏ (1 +  Rp,T)𝑇𝑡=1 ] − 1                                      Equation 3 
Where: 
CRp: Cumulative portfolio return  
Rp,T: Return of the portfolio at time T 
3.2.1.2 Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
The abnormal return is the difference between the stock return at time T (see equation 1 above) 
and the market index return for the same period, which in Brazil is the Ibovespa index.  
                                                              ARi,T = Ri,T - Rm,T                                                                                Equation 4 
Where, 
ARi,T: Abnormal Return of stocki at time T  
Ri,T: Stocki return at time T  
Rm,T: Market index return at time T 
Hence, the Cumulative Abnormal Return (CAR) can be calculated as: 
                                                       𝐶𝐴Ri,T = ∑ ARi,T𝑇𝑡=0                                                 Equation 5 
Where, 
CARi,T: Cumulative Abnormal Return of stock i at time T  
In addition, to study the average CAR of the portfolios, I have followed the equation below: 
                                                        𝐶𝐴𝑅t̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ =
∑ 𝐶𝐴𝑅 i,T𝑇𝑡=0
𝑛
                                                   Equation 6 
Finally, I will test the CAR significance, using the t-stat. Here, the null hypothesis will be that 
the mean of the abnormal returns and the mean of the cumulative abnormal returns are equal to 
zero. The alternative hypothesis will be that the means are different than zero. 
H0: 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ i,t = 0 and 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ T = 0 
H1: 𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ i,t ≠ 0 and 𝐶𝐴𝑅̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ T ≠ 0 
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3.2.1.3 Regression Model  
To understand what drives the differences in the Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the IPOs in 
Brazil between 2005 and 2014, I have run the following multiple linear regression with OLS 
for three different periods – 1 year, 2 years and 3 years – after the IPO: 
CARt = α + β1 PE + β2 Crisis + β3 Underpricing + β4 Log( MarketCap) + ϵi          Equation 7 
Where, 
CARt:  Cumulative Abnormal Returns. It is the dependent variable and is calculated as the sum 
of all abnormal returns on a portfolio at a certain time.  
PE: Dummy variable that assigns the value of 1 if the IPO was PE-backed and 0 otherwise. It 
is expectable that this variable has a positive and significant effect on the dependent variable. 
Ritter (1991) divided his sample per industries but the results were not robust enough to 
conclude on the Private Equity’s effect. 
Crisis: Dummy variable that assigns the value of 1 if the IPO occurred before the financial 
crisis (2008) and 0 otherwise. One can see from the graphs above that most of the IPOs for this 
timespan occurred before the financial crisis. Thus, this drop in the quantities of IPO may also 
be related to the post-IPO performance. Eller (2012) found this variable to be positive and 
significant for the first three years after the IPO.  
Underpricing: Independent variable which is a phenomenon verified in the the first closing 
day. It might be relevant since “IPOs tend to be underpriced by investment banks” (Ritter, 
1991). Moreover, through time, it is possible that the investors’ high expectations may be 
readjusted which translates into a drop on the stock’s price. Thus, it is expected that its 
coefficient will be negative. This variable is calculated as follows: 
Underpricing = 
(First Closing Price - Offer Price)
Offer Price
 
Log(Market Cap): Control variable that is the logarithm of the Market Capitalization of the 
companies on the IPO’s day. The market capitalization can be defined as the price at which the 
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shares are sold in the first trading day times the number of shares of the company. Loughran 
and Ritter (1995) found a negative value for this variable’s coefficient. 
These independent variables were chosen based on previous similar researches, such as Ritter 
(1991) and Eller (2012), to understand what were the factors that drove the CAR performance. 
4 Empirical Findings 
4.1 Results of the Buy and Hold strategy 
Graph 2.  Monthly cumulative returns of the two portfolios – PE-backed and Non-PE-Backed 
 
From the graph above, one can see that the trends of the cumulative returns of both portfolios 
are decreasing in the first eighteen months and increasing from that point onwards. Moreover, 
companies that were not PE-backed have slightly outperformed, on average, the PE-backed 
ones on the overall 3-year period after the IPO. In the end of the three-year time span, both 
portfolios had negative cumulative returns: the PE-backed portfolio lost 14,7% while the non-
PE-backed portfolio’s cumulative return was of -10,8%. 
Regarding the non-PE-Backed portfolio, one can see that it has registered, on average, positive 
cumulative returns in the first six months after the IPO. During this time, the cumulative returns 
reached its highest value of 15,02% which is explained by the fact that in that period, the market 
had, on average, a positive performance for more than a week, leading to a growth of the 
cumulative returns that was higher than the “normal” performance. In addition, it reached its 
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in this sample have occurred in 2007 and sixteen months after it, occurred the financial crisis 
of 2008, which may be related to the stock price drop. 
On the other hand, PE-Backed companies have had positive cumulative returns, on average, on 
the second month after the IPO, where its highest value (0,32%) was registered. From then on, 
the Cumulative Returns were negative (the lowest value was of -36,4% on the nineteenth month 
after the IPO) and its trend was very similar to the non-PE-Backed portfolio. 
4.1.1 Descriptive statistics of the Cumulative Returns 
The descriptive statistics of the Cumulative Returns of both portfolios can be seen below. 
Table 3. Descriptive Statistics of the Buy and Hold strategy's portfolios 
  PE-backed Non-PE-backed 
Mean -19,56% -18,40% 
Median -21,05% -20,93% 
Max 0,32% 15,02% 
Min -36,39% -38,72% 
Std. Deviation 0,1172 0,1509 
Skewness 0,2421 0,5041 
Kurtosis -1,1470 -0,7048 
Number of IPOs 67 41 
Source: Author's computations   
 
From the table above, one can conclude that the non-PE-backed portfolio was more volatile 
than the PE-Backed one, which makes sense since higher volatility should mean higher returns. 
Moreover, the non-PE-Backed portfolio have registered both the highest and the lowest 
cumulative returns on this sample. 
In addition, it is interesting to verify that the average returns for both portfolios were negative, 
both at around -19%. 
Regarding the statistical significance analysis of the sample, which was computed using the t-
Test: Paired Two Sample for Means, the t Stat of the sample was -6,23, the t Critical was 1,96 
and the P-value was 0. Thus, one can conclude that the samples have statistical significance at 
a 5% level, as seen below. 




4.2 Results of the analysis of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns  
To understand if the market effects accounted for the Cumulative Returns, I have analyzed the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns for the first 3 years after the IPO. Moreover, the market index 
used to calculate the abnormal returns was the Brazilian one - IBOV index. 
Graph 3. Daily cumulative abnormal returns of the two portfolios and the market as a whole  
 
As one can observe, the shape of this graph is, in general, similar to the previous one, meaning 
that the market did not have much influence on the stock’s overall performance. 
Regarding the CAR, the non-PE-Backed portfolio has, once again, slightly outperformed the 
PE-Backed portfolio. However, in this case, the PE-Backed portfolio lost 29,7% of its value 
while the non-PE-backed portfolio’s CAR was of -20,8% in the end of the third year after the 
IPO. In addition, regarding the total sample, the CAR was of -25,9%.  
Moreover, the declining trend of the CAR in both portfolios in the first year and a half after the 
IPO is in accordance to previous studies, such as Eller (2012).  
4.1.2 Descriptive statistics of the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
Below, one can find the descriptive statistics of the CAR variable for the total sample, PE-
Backed sample and non-PE-backed sample for the first, second and third years after the IPO. 
 
t-Test: Paired Two Sample for Means








1 3 5 7 9 11 13 15 17 19 21 23 25 27 29 31 33 35
Monthly Cumulative Abnormal Returns
Total Sample PE-Backed Non-PE-Backed
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Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the dependent variable – CAR - for all samples 
 CAR12 (1 Year) CAR24 (2 years) CAR36 (3 years) 
Total Sample       
Mean -9,71% -21,75% -24,43% 
Median -9,59% -24,43% -29,48% 
Max 1,06% 1,06% 1,06% 
Min -22,20% -36,10% -36,10% 
Std. Deviation 0,0855 0,1383 0,1188 
Skewness -0,0410 0,4485 1,0583 
Kurtosis -1,6273 -1,3474 -0,1691 
Number of IPOs 108 108 108 
PE-backed       
Mean -12,64% -23,16% -26,08% 
Median -13,24% -25,69% -31,42% 
Max 0,06% 0,06% 0,06% 
Min -24,28% -36,63% -36,63% 
Std. Deviation 0,0818 0,1235 0,1089 
Skewness 0,1923 0,5293 1,1620 
Kurtosis -1,3358 -1,1017 0,1239 
Number of IPOs 67 67 67 
Non-PE-Backed       
Mean -5,00% -19,80% -22,28% 
Median -3,63% -22,93% -26,88% 
Max 10,75% 10,75% 10,75% 
Min -19,27% -38,28% -38,28% 
Std. Deviation 0,0993 0,1680 0,1415 
Skewness -0,0780 0,4142 0,9356 
Kurtosis -1,2305 -1,4008 -0,2853 
Number of IPOs 41 41 41 
t-Test: Paired Two 
Sample for Means 
-6,2344 -3,0413 -4,8409 
Source: Author's computations 
   
As shown above, the CAR’s mean of the non-PE-Backed portfolio was higher than the CAR’s 
mean of the PE-Backed portfolio in the first, second and third years after the IPO. In addition, 
that portfolio was also more volatile in the same time span, which makes sense since usually 
more volatility means higher returns. Moreover, none of the distributions are normal since the 
skewness are not zero and the kurtosis are not equal to three. 
The t-test for equal means was also performed for the three years in analysis and they are all 
significant at a 5% level. 
The table below shows the descriptive statistics of the independent variables for all samples. 
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Table 5. Descriptive statistics of the independent variables for all samples 
 PE Crisis Underpricing Log(MarketCap) 
Total Sample         
Mean 0,6204 0,6574 -0,25% 959,77% 
Median 1 1 0,06% 941,49% 
Max 1 1 8,36% 1250,47% 
Min 0 0 -45,44% 786,09% 
Std. Deviation 0,4876 0,4768 0,0517 0,8611 
Number of IPOs 108 108 108 108 
PE-backed         
Mean 1 0,7164 -0,23% 959,52% 
Median 1 1 0,35% 941,98% 
Max 1 1 8,36% 1250,47% 
Min 1 0 -45,44% 839,84% 
Std. Deviation 0 0,4541 0,0632 0,7272 
Number of IPOs 67 67 67 67 
Non-PE-Backed         
Mean 0 0,5610 -0,29% 960,19% 
Median 0 1 0,04% 928,89% 
Max 0 1 5,32% 1241,89% 
Min 0 0 -5,32% 786,09% 
Std. Deviation 0 0,5024 0,0236 1,0539 
Number of IPOs 41 41 41 41 
Source: Author's computations    
 
As one can observe, the average Market Capitalization in the day of the IPO was very similar 
in the two portfolios, meaning that this phenomenon does not occur more often in a portfolio 
then in the other. 
Regarding the “Crisis” variable, one can conclude that there were more PE-Backed companies 
going public before the financial crisis of 2008 since the number of IPOs is higher and so is the 
mean of this variable, when compared to the non-PE-Backed firms. 
Finally, the “Underpricing” was the least volatile variable and its mean was negative in both 
portfolios, meaning that, on average, on the first closing price, both portfolios lost value. 
Private Equity investment and the Post-IPO performance Afonso Sacavém Potes (32294) 
22 
 
4.3 Regressions’ Results 
To understand if Private Equity has significant impact on the Cumulative Abnormal Returns 
for one, two and three years after the IPO, I have run the regression presented above (Equation 
7) and the results are shown below. 
For the first year after the IPO (see table 6 in the attachments), the R2 is not significant enough 
since it means that only 14,57% of the change in the dependent variable (CAR12) is driven by 
the four independent variables. However, regarding the Significance-f, which should be less 
than 0.05, it was considered significant. In addition, the coefficients of the four variables were 
all extremely low, namely the Private Equity’s coefficient, and the P-values were extremely big 
(with exception for Crisis variable) meaning that there is no statistical significance. Moreover, 
it is curious to observe that all the coefficients have the signal that was predicted in section 4. 
Regarding the second year (see table 7 in the Attachments), the results are different than the 
first one: the R2 increased to 23,66% and the Significance-F is 0. However, the coefficients are 
not significant since they are all close to 0 even though the P-value for the Crisis value is less 
than 0,05. 
Finally, the conclusions of the third regression (see table 8 in the Attachments) are similar to 
the previous one. The coefficients of the variables are too small, despite the P-Value for Crisis 
and Log(Market CAP) are close to 0. Moreover, the Significance-F is almost 0 and the R2 is 
21,8%. 
Hence, when analyzing the three regressions, one can see that they were not statistically 
significant, thus I cannot conclude anything regarding the influence of Private Equity in the 
long-run performance, nor explain what drives the changes in CAR through time.  




This study intended to understand if the companies that were Private Equity-backed before 
going public had better long-run performance than the firms which were not PE-backed, in 
Brazil, between 2005 and 2014.  
To analyse the post-IPO performance, two portfolios were built: one with PE-backed companies 
only and another one with non-PE-backed companies. Then, a “Buy and hold” strategy was 
performed to measure the Cumulative Returns of both portfolios and the Cumulative Abnormal 
Returns for the two portfolios were calculated. From these analysis, two main conclusions were 
drawn from this dissertation: oppositely to other studies, it was found that in Brazil, between 
2004 and 2015, (1) it was indifferent if the IPOs were Private Equity-backed or not, regarding 
their long-run performance, since the CARs of both portfolios had values that were close to one 
another and (2) that in any case, in the three years after the IPO, the CARs were negative, 
meaning that both portfolios had considerable losses. 
Moreover, to understand if Private Equity investment is related to the changes in the CAR, I 
performed a regression for each year after the IPO occurrence. However, the results were 
statistically insignificant in all three regressions.  
Finally, the main obstacles for this study were (1) the low number of IPO occurrences in Brazil 
between 2005 and 2014, which in other markets, such as the European or the North American 
ones would have not been a problem and (2) the fact that when calculating the abnormal returns, 
I used the Ibovespa market index for all of the companies despite their industry sector. Thus, if 
I would have had access to the different industries market indexes, such as the “Índice de 
Consumo (ICON)”, “Índice Financeiro (IFNC)” and the “Índice Imobiliário (IMOB)”, it would 
have been more accurate and the returns may would have been different, leading to more 
detailed empirical results. 
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Table 6. Regression  of CAR12 (1 year after the IPO) 
SUMMARY 
OUTPUT      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0,381769896     
R Square 0,145748253     
Adjusted R Square 0,112573428     
Standard Error 0,787036344     
Observations 108     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 4 10,88539727 2,721349318 4,393339008 0,002549176 
Residual 103 63,80089933 0,619426207   
Total 107 74,6862966      
      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept 0,624210386 0,885563633 0,704873555 0,482479798  
Private Equity 0,014938086 0,158101274 0,094484289 0,924908026  
Crisis -0,677047277 0,163162806 -4,1495197 6,87173E-05  
Underpricing -0,512499107 1,483808294 -0,345394421 0,73050226  
Log(Market Cap) -0,046485105 0,089646129 -0,518540011 0,605193771  
 
















OUTPUT      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0,48651723     
R Square 0,236699015     
Adjusted R Square 0,207056259     
Standard Error 0,83924191     
Observations 108     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 4 22,49635622 5,624089055 7,985054087 1,19972E-05 
Residual 103 72,54567926 0,704326983   
Total 107 95,04203548       
      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept 1,852351362 0,944304694 1,961603467 0,052507753  
Private Equity 0,061018771 0,168588421 0,361939277 0,718138895  
Crisis -0,959530763 0,173985694 -5,51499804 2,60331E-07  
Underpricing -0,320174586 1,582232022 -0,20235628 0,840037365  
Log(Market Cap) -0,169573693 0,095592522 -1,773922171 0,07903112 
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OUTPUT      
      
Regression Statistics     
Multiple R 0,466851291     
R Square 0,217950128     
Adjusted R Square 0,187579259     
Standard Error 0,810038973     
Observations 108     
      
ANOVA      
  df SS MS F Significance F 
Regression 4 18,83526494 4,708816234 7,176288887 3,87974E-05 
Residual 103 67,5848032 0,656163138   
Total 107 86,42006814       
      
  Coefficients Standard Error t Stat P-value  
Intercept 3,504815062 0,911445908 3,845335232 0,000208728  
Private Equity -0,038130465 0,162722083 -0,234328764 0,81519492  
Crisis -0,690112806 0,167931548 -4,109488737 7,97787E-05  
Underpricing 1,08684265 1,527175403 0,711668514 0,478278821  
Log(Market Cap) -0,345985064 0,092266207 -3,749856789 0,000292512  
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